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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, to review all decisions of the district courts
involving domestic relations cases including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and
paternity under Section 78-2a-3(h) U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court granted the Appellee's Motion To Dismiss/Motion For
Summary Judgment. The issues to be decided on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the Petitioner's

Complaint with prejudice. Because the District Court applied Utah's Common
Law Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, in
dismissing the Petitioner's Complaint, the review presents a question of law
and one reviewed under a correctness standard. Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen,
907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995). Also, in reviewing a district court's dismissal
of a complaint pursuant to summary judgment, the review is one of correctness.
Taylor v. Qgden Sch. Dist.. 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). When construing
a statute, the reviewing authority must give effect to the intent of the legislature
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Craftsman Builder's
Supply v. Butler Mfg.. 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999).
2.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that the Appellee had
Brief*** page 6

not waived any defenses to the Appellant's action A review of a district court's
determination is a question of law reviewed for correctness Plateau Mm v
Utah Div Of State Lands, 802 P 2d 720 (Utah 1990)
3.

Whether the District Court erred in finding Utah's Common Law

Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4 5 U C A (1953), as amended, constitutional
and rejecting arguments that the statute is one of limitations or repose

A

review presents a question of law with no deference given to the trial court
Warren v Melville, 937 P 2d 556 (Ut App 1997) However, a strong
presumption exists that a statute is constitutional with doubts resolved in favor
of its constitutionality IcL
4.

Whether the District Court erred in failing to award the Appellee

attorneys fees and costs and whether he is entitled to them on appeal
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an action by the Appellant/Petitioner seeking to establish a
common law marriage under Section 30-1 4 5 U C A (1953), as amended, in
order to obtain a division of properties owned by the Appellee/Respondent and
an award of alimony in the form of a decree of divorce
B. Course of Proceedings.
The Appellant and Appellee were married on February 25, 1969, and
divorced in 1980 (R 33) Shortly thereafter, they decided to reside together
and did so until July 7, 1996, when they separated for the final time (R 33)
Brief*** page 7

The Appellant filed an action in the Third Judicial District Court on
October 7, 1996, seeking to establish a common law marriage (R 1) Her
Complaint also sought, inter aha, a decree of divorce and an award of the
Appellee's assets, an allocation of debts, and an award of alimony
The Appellee answered the Complaint on February 14, 1997 and set
forth as an affirmative defense that the Appellant had failed to state a claim for
which relief could be granted
Thereafter, the Appellant did nothing to move the case to trial or to
establish the marriage relationship Indeed, the only requests for a trial date
were filed by the Respondent.1 It is undisputed that the Appellant failed to
establish any common law marriage relationship between the parties either
during their relationship or within one year following the termination of the their
relationship (R 209, R 223 )
During the course of the proceedings, the parties engaged in discovery
The Appellant also filed a Motion For Order To Show Cause seeking
temporary spousal support on August 29, 1997 (R 21) The parties settled this
Motion prior to hearing with the Appellee voluntarily agreeing to pay temporary
alimony pending trial on the condition that such agreement could not be
construed as an admission or precedent for an alimony award at trial (R 67)

1 rhe Appellee s first request was filed on Februan 14 1997 (R 9) The Appellee s second request was
filed on September 29 1997 (R 59)
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Trial was scheduled for August 12, 1998. Oi1 At igiis! 10, 1998, the
Appellee mailed and faxed to opposing counsel a Motion To Dismiss. (R. 124125). The Motion to Dismiss was based on Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure because the Appellant had failed to establish a common law
marriage relationship within one year following the termination of the parties'
relationship. (R. 126-129). I I le Motioi i r o Disn iiss was filed with the Court on
August 12, 1998, the day of trial.
On August 12, 1998, before trial, the parties' counsel discussed the
Appellee's Motion I o Dismiss in chambers with the trial court, the Honorable
Anne M. Stirba, presiding. After having discussed the matter off record, the
parties went on record and argued their respective cases concerning the
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss. (Transcript of Proceedings, 8/12/99, p. 3). The
Court then recessed and convened again in chambers. (Id., p. 18). At that
time, the Appellant asked that tl le trial be continued and that the Appellai it be
given the opportunity to prepare and file a responsive brief to the Appellee's'
Motion To Dismiss. (Id.). The Court suggested that the matter be re-filed by
the Appellee in the form of a Motion For Summary Judgment. (Id., p. 19). The
Court stated that it may refer the matter to the domestic relations commissioner
for a decision in accordance with the Code of Judicial Administration. (Id., p.
20). On August 17, 1998, the Appellee filed a combined Motion To Dismiss
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and Motion For Summary Judgment.2 (R. 141). This time, the motion was
made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Id.).
Judge Stirba referred the matter to the domestic relations commissioner.
Commissioner Michael S. Evans heard oral argument from both parties on
November 17, 1998, and took the matter under consideration. Commissioner
Evans entered a Minute Entry on December 2, 1998 recommending that the
Appellant's Motion be granted and recommending the Appellant's Complaint be
dismissed. (R. 209). A formal order was prepared dismissing the action. (R.
222).
Thereafter, on December 14, 1998, the Appellant objected to
Commissioner Evan's recommended order. (R. 214). Judge Stirba heard oral
arguments once again on February 11, 1999. (R. 227). Judge Stirba
concluded that Commissioner Evan's decision was correct, concluded that the
Appellee's motion to dismiss should be granted, but denied the Appellee's
request for attorney's fees and costs. (Id). A formal order styled Order
Denying Petitioner's Objections and Order Dismissing Action was entered by
Judge Stirba on March 2, 1999. (R. 228).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

2 At the time, the Appellee also filed a Motion to Amend Answer and an Amended Answer to remove am
doubt concerning the Appellant's position that the Respondent had failed to comph with Utah's Common
Law Marriage Statute (R 131-135)
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The District Court granted the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss/Summary
Judgment dismissing the Appellant's action with prejudice on March 2, 1999.
(R.228). The District Court denied the Appellee's request for attorney's fees at
the same time.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The dispositive facts in this case are not disputed. The Appellant and
Appellee were married on February 25, 1969, and divorced in 1980. (R. 33).
Shortly thereafter they decided to reside together and did so until July 7, 1996,
when they separated tor the final time. (R.33). The Appellant tilpd her action
in the Third Judicial District Court on October 7, 1996. (R.1). No proceeding
was initiated or obtained by the Appellant to establish the common law
relationship either during their relationship or within one year of their
separation as required by Section 30-1-4.5(2) U.C.A. (1953), as amended. . (R.
209, R. 223.). Given these undisputed facts, the Appellant's case had no merit
under the holding of Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) and
should be dismissed.
The Appellant acknowledges that she failed to follow the procedural
requirements set forth in Section 30-1-4.5 and that Bunch disposes of her
action. In an effort to avoid this conclusion, however, the Appellant advances
arguments that require discussion of additional facts. These additional facts
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are addressed below under subparagraphs relevant to the Appellant's
arguments.
Pleadings. The Appellant filed her Complaint on October 7, 1996. (R.
1). The only reference to a common law marriage is contained in Paragraph 2
of the Appellant's Complaint:
"2.

Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband having first married
in 1969 later divorced in 1980, however, they continued to reside
together and held themselves out as husband and wife from
February, 1980 to the date the (sic) separation on approximately
July 7, 1996."

As will be argued infra, the Appellee believed that the Appellant's Complaint
was fatally deficient. Therefore, the Appellant responded, consistent with Rule
11, to the common law allegations to the extent they were alleged, and
admitted Paragraph 2 of the Appellant's Complaint, but also set up an
affirmative defense under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as
follows:
"FIRST DEFENSE
The Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a cause of action against
the Defendant upon which relief may be granted."
While it is true that the Appellee also admitted or denied allegations
concerning relief that the Appellant was seeking, the Appellee believed, as
argued below, that such a response was appropriate and consistent with Utah
law in the area of domestic relations.
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When the Appellee presented his Motion To Dismiss on August 12,
1998, the Appellant asserted that the Appellee's pleading was ambiguous as to
whether or not he admitted a common law relationship While not conceding
that any ambiguity existed, the Appellee filed an Amended Answer to the
Appellant's Complaint on August 17, 1998, to remove any question that the
Appellee's pleading was ambiguous (R 131 and 136) The Amended Answer
unequivocally stated that no common law marriage was entered into and that
the Appellant's Complaint should be dismissed (Id )
Thereafter, with the lower Court's permission (Transcript of Proceedings,
8/12/98, p 21), the Appellee re-filed his motion to dismiss in the form of a
Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment (R 141)
Timeliness The Appellee's initial Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum
was faxed to the Appellant on August 10, 1998, two days before trial (R 124125, R 126-129) It was filed with the Court on the day of trial At trial, the
Appellant initially argued against the Appellee's Motion To Dismiss (Transcript
of Proceedings, 8/12/98, p 3) In addition, the Court continued the trial to
allow the Appellant to fully brief the issues and to submit further oral argument
(Id., p 15-16, 18-21)
On August 17, 1998, the Appellee re-filed his motion in the form of a
Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment (R 141) The
Appellant replied by filing a Memorandum in Opposition To Motion To Dismiss
Brief *** page 13

and Motion for Summary Judgment on August 26, 1998. (R. 150). As
mentioned above, Judge Stirba then referred the matter to Domestic
Commissioner Michael S. Evans for a decision. Commissioner Evans then
took oral argument from both parties on November 17, 1998, and took the
matter under consideration. Commissioner Evan's entered a Minute Entry on
December 2, 1998, recommending that the Appellant's Motion be granted and
recommending dismissing the Appellant's Complaint. (R. 209). A formal order
was prepared dismissing the action. (R. 227). After Commissioner Evans
entered a decision, Judge Stirba again took oral arguments from both parties,
ruled against the Appellant, and entered a further order dismissing the action
on March 2, 1999. (R. 228).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Appellee respectfully submits that Utah's Common Law Marriage
Statute, Section 30-1-4.5, is a procedural statute whereby parties may
establish a relationship as marital in nature by alleging and proving certain
elements as required by the statute. Here, the Appellant wholly failed to follow
the statute and failed to allege or prove the requisite elements. Under Bunch v.
Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), the Appellant's action must be
dismissed.
The Appellee respectfully submits that his pleadings were not defective
in any respect. To the extent that the Appellant made any allegations
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concerning a common law relationship, the Appellee properly addressed them
in his pleadings. However, the Appellant's Complaint wholly failed to state a
cause of action for a common law marriage and the Appellee's affirmative
defense, of failure to state a claim, was appropriate and sufficient to place the
Appellant on notice that her Complaint was defective.
The Appellee respectfully submits that both of his Motions, i.e., his initial
Motion To Dismiss filed on August 12, 1998 and his Motion To Dismiss and
Motion For Summary Judgement filed on August 17, 1998, were timely and that
the Appellee did not waive any right to file the Motions.
The Appellee respectfully submits that Utah's Common Law Marriage
Statute is constitutional. It is neither a statute of limitations nor a statute of
repose but merely a procedure that must be followed by a party in order to
establish a valid common law marriage in Utah.
The Appellee respectfully submits that the trial court erred in not
awarding the Appellee attorney's fees and costs and the Appellee seeks a
recovery of those attorney's fees and costs below as well as on appeal. The
Appellee respectfully requests that this Court remand for the purpose of
ascertaining such fees and costs.
ARGUMENT
Point One
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING
THE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT
Brief*** page 15

A. Introduction.
The District Court dismissed the Appellant's Complaint with prejudice
because the Appellant did not comply with Utah's Common Law Marriage
Statute, Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. In doing so, the District
Court primarily relied upon Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Ut.App. 1995)
that is controlling in this action. The Appellant admittedly failed to properly
allege or prove any compliance with the statute. Therefore, the District Court
dismissed the Appellant's Complaint. The District Court's ruling was correct
and should not be disturbed on appeal.
Recognizing these fatal defects, the Appellant attempted below, as she
does on appeal, to misdirect the Court in its analysis of this case and argue
that the Appellee's Motion To Dismiss was not timely and that the Appellee
waived his Motion To Dismiss. The District Court likewise considered these
two arguments and rejected them as having no merit. The District Court's
ruling was correct on these issues and likewise should not be disturbed on
appeal.
B. The Appellant Failed To Plead Or Prove Compliance With Utah's
Common Law Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), as
amended.
The Statute. The State has had, and continues to have, a strong public
interest in regulating marriages. The State's recognition of a valid marriage
affects a great many things including, but not limited to, the legitimization of
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children and the right to inherit. The State's right to regulate marriage through
the passage of legislation cannot be denied.
Accordingly, the State Of Utah through legislation has the right to grant
or deny the right to marriage.3 For example, the State has the right, as it does,
to prohibit incestuous marriages (Section 30-1-1) and to prohibit polygamous
marriages, under-age marriages, and same-sex marriages (Section 30-1-2).
There are strong public policy reasons why such is prohibited.
The State also has the right, as it does, to regulate the procedures
required to become married, such as the requirement for solemnization
(Section 30-1-6) and the requirement to apply for and obtain a marriage license
(Section 30-1-7 and 8) and to have such marriage licenses properly recorded
(Section 30-1-12). These statutes serve a strong public interest in assuring
that a number of obvious public policies concerning marriages and marriage
relationships will be preserved.
Utah did not recognize the validity of a common law marriage until 1987
when Utah enacted Section 30-1-4.5. Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 43
P.2d 696 (Utah 1935). Therefore, neither the establishment of a common law
marriage nor the remedy of a divorce from a common law relationship existed
prior to 1987.

3 Utah has had marriage statutes since 1898 when it became a state
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When Utah's Legislature enacted Section 30-1-4 5, the Legislature knew
and understood the significance and importance of the statutes granting
"conventional" marriages The Legislature also knew of the mischief that could
be easily created by enacting a common law marriage statute that had no
criteria or procedures Therefore, the Legislature enacted a limited exception
to the "conventional" procedure by which one could become married and
enacted a common law marriage statute that set forth certain requirements,
both substantive and procedural, that had to be satisfied before the State
would acknowledge a valid common law marriage With the passage of
Section 30-1-4 5, the Utah Legislature required the establishment of certain
facts and the completion of certain procedures before a valid common law
marriage would be legally recognized
Pleading and Compliance The Appellant failed to properly plead a
cause of action for a common law marriage or comply with the procedure in
Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute to establish a common law marriage
Here, all the Appellant pleaded was that the "[parties] continued to reside
together and held themselves out as husband and wife from February, 1980 to
the date the (sic) separated on approximately July 7, 1996 " Section 30-14 5(1) identifies the factors that must be established in order to allege the
existence of a common law marriage
"(1)

A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter
shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order
Brief*** page 18

establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting
parties who:
(a)
are capable of giving consent;
(b)
are legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage
under the provisions of this chapter;
(c)
have cohabitated;
(d)
mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations;
and
(e)
who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform
and general reputation as husband and wife."
While no Utah Court has yet indicated the elements that must be pleaded in
order to allege and state a cause of action, one may determine that the
following elements are minimally necessary:
(1)

That a "relationship" existed that arose "out of a contract between
two consenting parties";

(2)

That the parties were "capable of giving consent";

(3)

That the parties were "legally capable of entering into a
solemnized marriage";

(4)

That the parties "cohabitated";

(5)

That the parties "mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and
obligations";

(6)

That the parties held "themselves out as and have acquired a
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife"; and

(7)

That a "determination or establishment of a marriage" occurred
during the "relationship" or "within one year following the
termination of that relationship."

In this case, the Appellant's Complaint failed to allege items (1), (2), (3),
(5), and (7). When the Appellee filed his Answer, he set forth an Affirmative
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Defense that the Appellant's Complaint failed to state a cause of action against
him upon which relief could be granted.
The procedure admittedly not followed in this case is Section 30-1-4.5(2)
that requires the establishment of a common law marriage by a court or
administrative agency either during the relationship or within one year of the
termination of that relationship. It provides as follows:
"(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the relationship described in
Subparagraph (1), or within one year following the termination of
that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this
section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under
the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases."
Under the facts of this case, the establishment of the common law
marriage could have occurred at any time after the enactment of Section 30-14.5 on July 1, 1987, until July 7, 1997, (one year after the parties separated).
Procedurally, it had to have been established by either a court or administrative
order within that time frame. Here, the Appellant had over 10 years to establish
her claim of a valid common law marriage. Within that time frame, the
Appellant had a year following her separation from the Appellee, from July 7,
1996, to July 7, 1997, to establish her claim of a valid common law marriage.
It is undisputed that the Appellant took no steps to comply with the statute and
failed to obtain any court or administrative order establishing the relationship
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during that time frame. It is undisputed that the Appellant took no efforts to
even seek a hearing after her Complaint was filed on October 7, 1996.4
Based upon the above, the District Court dismissed the Appellant's
Complaint with prejudice because the Appellant failed to comply with Utah's
Common Law Marriage Statute. The facts of this case are indistinguishable
from those in Bunch v. Englehom, supra. There, the Plaintiff likewise failed to
obtain a determination during the parties relationship or within one year of the
termination of the parties relationship. The defendant in that action move to
dismiss after opening statements on the basis that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction due to the Plaintiffs failure to comply with Utah's Common
Law Marriage Statute. The trial court did so. The trial court's decision was
upheld on appeal. This Court held that the "plain meaning" of the statute
required the Plaintiff to obtain a "timely determination of her relationship with
Englehom" and she failed to do so. k l , p. 921. The facts in the present case
are identical. The District Court did not err in determining that Bunch was
controlling and dismissing the Appellant's Complaint. The District Court's
decision should be upheld.
Point Two

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HAD
NOT WAIVED ANY DEFENSES TO THE APPELLANT'S ACTION

4 The only requests for a trial in this case were filed by the Appellee. One was on February 14. 1997. and the
other was on September 29. 1997. (R. 9 and R. 59).
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A. The Appellee's Motion To Dismiss Was Timely.
The Appellant argued below, as she does on appeal, that the Appellee's
Motion To Dismiss was not timely. The District Court ruled that the Appellee's
Motion to Dismiss was timely. The District Court's ruling should be upheld
here.
The Appellant's primary complaint is that the Appellee filed his initial
Motion To Dismiss the day trial was scheduled on August 12, 1998.5 However,
it should be noted that the trial in this matter was continued without date in
order for the Appellant to have sufficient time in which to prepare and file a
responsive memorandum.6 Thereafter, the Appellee re-filed his Motion in the
form of a Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Summary Judgment and the
Appellant was given more than adequate opportunity to respond.7
The Appellant's argument may have had some merit had the trial not
been continued and she was not provided an adequate opportunity to respond.
Yet, the trial was continued at the Appellant's own request. Having done so, it
is quixotic to suggest that she may now continue to object to the timeliness of
the Respondent's Motion

5 The Appellee had previously faxed a cop\ of the Motion to Dismiss and accompammg memorandum to
counsel on August 10. 1998 (R 124-125 and 126-129)
6 The Appellant does not complain on appeal about not haung sufficient time in which to adequateh prepaie
am defense to the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss
7 Indeed, the Appellant lequested and recened an additional period of time in which to prepare a response to
the Appellee's Motion (R 144-145)
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The filing of the Motion to Dismiss on the day of trial by Appellee was
proper in every respect. This was the same process and procedure permitted
by the Court in Bunch v. Englehorn, supra. There, the defendant filed an
answer to the plaintiff's complaint with an affirmative defense, as in the instant
case, and moved to dismiss the plaintiffs action following opening arguments
at trial. This Court rejected Bunch's claim that she was surprised by the oral
motion to dismiss on the day of trial and ruled that the motion was timely. This
Court stated, "Assuming, arguendo, that Bunch was surprised by the motion,
she could have asked the trial court for a continuance and/or made a postjudgment motion to present her issues to the trial court." Id, p. 921.
The Appellee was not required to file his Motion To Dismiss at a point
prior to trial as suggested by Appellant. The Appellee's Motion To Dismiss was
made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under
Rule 12(h), such a motion may be brought at any time including "at the trial on
the merits." A motion going to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court may
also be raised at any time. Bunch, supra, and Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P.
Both Commissioner Evans and Judge Stirba found Appellee's Motion
To Dismiss timely and rejected the Appellant's arguments. The Appellee
respectfully submits that their decisions should be upheld.
B. The Appellee Did Not Waive His Motion To Dismiss.
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Statute Of Limitations Argument. The Appellant's first argument is that
the District Court erred by rejecting the Appellant's argument that Utah's
Common Law Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4.5(2), is, in reality, a "statue of
limitations". And, by bootstrapping that argument, the Appellant argues that the
Appellee waived the statute of limitations defense because he did not set forth
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.8
The District Court determined that Section 30-1-4.5(2) was not a statute
of limitations and rejected the Appellant's argument The District Court
concluded that the Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute, Section 30-1-4.5(2)
was not a statute of limitations but merely a procedure that permits a party to
establish a common law marriage by complying with the requirements of the
statute. (R.209-213, R. 222-226). Therefore, the Appellee was not required to
set forth a "statute of limitations" affirmative defense in his pleadings.
The District Court's decision should not be disturbed on appeal. Section
30-1-4.5(2) is a procedure whereby a party, not having previously enjoyed a
"conventional marriage", may obtain a determination that a common law
marriage existed. In doing so, however, the statute mandates that certain
requirements be met before a common law marriage relationship is
established. If one fails to follow the procedures, the common law marriage

8 The Appellee set forth the affirmati\e defense of failure to state a claim but no affirmative defense of a
statute of limitations
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relationship is not established. Statutes setting forth procedures to be
followed, before a right, status, or privilege is conferred, are not uncommon.
The Respondent submits that Utah's legislature possesses the
discretion to enact statutes that establish time periods and procedures to be
followed and that such statutes are presumptively constitutional. McHenrv v.
Utah Valley Hospital 724 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D.Utah 1989). As held in Carrier
v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 355 (Utah 1997), rules of procedure
are presumed to be constitutional and any doubts are resolved in favor of
constitutionality.
The District Court's rejection of the Appellant's statute of limitations
argument, and bootstrapped waiver argument, should be upheld by this Court.
Pleadings. The Appellant argues that the Appellee admitted a common
law marriage existed in his Answer and therefore waived any right to present
his Motion To Dismiss. The District Court rejected the Appellant's argument
and its decision should not be disturbed on appeal.
Here, the Appellant filed an inartfully drafted complaint. Admittedly, one
could divine that the Appellant attempted to plead a common law marriage.
However, the statutory elements of a common law marriage were not pleaded
including one very significant element, i.e., that a judicial determination of the
relationship had occurred within one year of the parties' separation.
Accordingly, the Appellee filed an Answer admitting (to the extent alleged) that
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some elements of a common law relationship existed between the parties, but
not all, and also set forth the affirmative defense that the Appellant's Complaint
failed to state a cause of action against the Appellee.9 This was sufficient to
put the Appellant on notice that her claim of a common law marriage against
the Appellee was defective. Thereafter, the Appellant made no effort to satisfy
the plain reading of the statute by either amending her Complaint or seeking a
determination of the parties' relationship within one year of separation.
Commissioner Evans ruled:
"In his Answer, respondent did assert the affirmative defense of failure
to state a cause of action, which is sufficient to put petitioner on notice
as to potential motions. Further, the factual basis of respondent's
Motion To Dismiss had not yet occurred at the time respondent filed
his Answer as one year had not yet passed from the time of termination
of the parties' alleged common law marriage relationship." (R. 210).
Judge Stirba agreed with Commissioner Evans. In overruling the Appellant's
objections to Commissioner Evans ruling, Judge Stirba obtained the
Appellant's concession that it was the Appellant's burden to comply with Utah's
Common Law Marriage Statute. (Transcript of Proceedings, 2/11/99, p. 16-17).
Further, Judge Stirba opined that a waiver argument may not even be
available to either party under Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute. (Id., p.
17). This is because the argument assumes that the statute's specific
9 The leasoning of Appellee m filing an Answer with an affirmatne defense, instead of immediateh filing a
Motion To Dismiss to the Appellant's Complaint was that (a) the penod in which to establish the mantal
relationship had not run and Appellee anticipated that the Appellant would file foi such a hearing within the
time period and (b). e\en if the Appellant failed to do so within the time period, the Court still might ha\e
power to diude joint assets and debts of paities who h\ed togethei based upon their stipulation to do so
undei the decision m Jenkins \ Jenkins. 153 P 2d 261. 264 (Utah 1944)
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requirement, that common law marriages be established only by "a court or
administrative order", may be waived. She doubted that the legislature had
that in mind. She suggested that a waiver argument would allow parties to
evade the requirements of the statute. (Id).
The Appellee respectfully argues that his Answer and affirmative
defense appropriately put the Appellant on notice that her pleading was
defective. The Appellant was obligated to move forward and comply with the
statute and she failed to do so. At no time did the Appellant waive his defense.
The Appellant's argument that the Appellee somehow waived his defenses by
"acquiescense", i.e., by participating in his defense of the Appellant's
Complaint and his trial preparation, is spurious. The Appellee is permitted by
the rules to engage in discovery and is required by rule to attend the trial
court's conferences. As stated supra, the Appellee's stipulation to a short
period of temporary spousal support was made without precedent to any
subsequent award of alimony. (R. 67). The District Court's holding rejecting
the Appellant's waiver argument should be affirmed.
In conclusion, the District Court properly ruled that the Appellant had
failed to comply with Utah's Common Law Marriage statute and properly
dismissed the Appellant's Complaint. The Appellant's arguments of timeliness
and waiver were properly rejected by the trial court. The District Court's
determinations should be upheld.
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Point Three
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING UTAH'S COMMON LAW
MARRIAGE STATUTE, SECTION 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED,
CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Introduction.
The Appellant's argument that Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute,
Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, is unconstitutional was rejected
by the District Court. The District Court rejected the Appellant's argument that
Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute was a statute of repose. (R.209-213, R.
222-226). The District Court's determination was correct and should not be
disturbed on appeal.
The Appellant argued below that Utah's Common Law Marriage Statute
is either an unconstitutional statute of limitations or an unconstitutional statue
of repose. The Appellant has apparently dropped her argument on appeal that
the statute is an unconstitutional statute of limitations. In any event, the
Appellee rejects both arguments and states that the statute is merely one of
procedure. Viewed either as a statute of limitations, statute of repose, or as
merely one of procedure, the statute is deemed presumptively constitutional.
McHenrv v. Utah Valley Hospital supra, p. 837 and Carrier v. Pro-Tech
Restoration, supra, p. 355. Here, the Appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional. Snow v. Keddington, 195
P.2d 234, 240(1948).
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B. Section 30-1-4.5(2) Is Not A Statute Of Repose.
First, the Appellee submits that Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not a statute of
repose because the statute did not "abrogate a remedy" available to the
Appellant under common law. The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that
a statute is not a statute of repose unless it extinguishes or abrogates a
remedy that was available under common law. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d
1159, 1166 (Utah 1996); Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 736 (Utah 1996); and
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 n.4, 680 (Utah 1985). In each
of these two former cases, the Court upheld Section 63-30-4(4) against a
statute of repose argument because it found that Section 63-30-4(4) did not
abrogate an existing legal remedy available at common law. In Berry, supra,
the Court indicated that an initial analysis should start with an inquiry
concerning the nature of the remedy allegedly abrogated by the statute of
repose and the substituted remedy. There must be some pre-existing remedy
being abrogated by the alleged statute of repose before a court may inquire
further.
In this case, there was no right under common law in this state for a
common law marriage. Here, the Appellant had no pre-existing marriage, right,
or remedy that was abrogated by operation of Utah's common law marriage
statute. The right to establish and claim a common law marriage in this state is
a statutory right created by Section 30-1-4.5. Therefore, even assuming
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Section 30-1-4.5(2) cuts off certain rights unless its procedures are met, it does
not follow that the section is a statute of repose because no right existed under
common law for common law marriages in this state.
Second, Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not a statute of repose because it merely
sets forth a procedure to be followed before a relationship is deemed a valid
marriage. The Appellant did not have a valid marriage to begin with. The
Appellant did not lose or forfeit any interest by operation of the statute as
occurs in true statutes of repose. A statute of repose, like a statute of
limitation, bars or terminates a pre-existing claim for relief. In this case, the
Appellant had no claim for relief to be barred or terminated because she failed
to follow the procedural requirements of the statute in order to validate her
alleged marriage relationship. As stated above, statutes that prescribe
procedures and time periods for parties to observe are presumptively valid.
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, supra.
Therefore, Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not a statute of repose.
C. Section 30-1-4.5(2) Is Not Unconstitutional
Even If It Is Characterized As A Statute Of Repose.
Not all statutes of repose are unconstitutional. 'To hold every statute of
repose unconstitutional without regard to the legislative purpose could result in
a legislative inability to cope with widespread social or economic evils." Berry,
supra, page 680. Rather, the burden is upon the Petitioner to demonstrate that
Berry's two part analysis has been met. This is not possible under the facts of
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this case.
The first prong of Berry requires the court to determine whether Section
30-1-4.5 provides an injured person an effective and reasonable remedy to that
remedy being abrogated by the statute. Indeed it does even assuming the
statute abrogated a remedy existing at common law. The Appellant had from
July 1, 1987, (the effective date of the statute) to July 7, 1997, (one year
following the parties' separation) in which to established a valid marriage. She
could have done this while the relationship was ongoing or within one year
after its termination. The Appellant chose not to do so. The Appellant does not
explain her failure to take advantage of this effective and reasonable remedy.
The Appellant complains that one year is too short; however, statutes of
limitations having similar time periods have been upheld. Lee v. Gaufin, 867
P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) (also involving statutes of repose arguments). As
indicated in Lee, the Legislature's fixing of lengths of times for limitations is
afforded great latitude. Id., 575-576. Moreover, the Appellant was not limited
to one year. She had over 10 years to establish her claim of a valid common
law marriage. The barring of a remedy caused by the Appellant's own failure to
take advantage of Section 30-1-4.5 within the time period afforded by statute
does not afford her the right to complain.
The Appellant's argument that Section 30-1-4.5(2) is not definitive
concerning where to obtain a determination of the marriage relationship within
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one year of separation is without merit. In the first place, the statute is clear
that a party must establish the common law marriage relationship by "a court or
administrative order." The plain meaning of the statute is that the moving party
must seek either a judicial or an administrative determination. Here the
Appellant filed her Complaint before the "Court" but made no effort to seek a
"determination" or "establishment" by the Court. Second, the Bunch decision
was issued in 1995. Any uncertainty concerning the procedure of the statute
and how it operated was removed by Bunch prior to the filing of the Appellant's
Complaint. Therefore, the Appellant cannot sustain her burden under Berry's
first prong of analysis.
Second, even if there were no substitute or alternative remedy provided
as required by the first prong of Berry, the Court may still deem the abrogation
justified if "there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable
means of achieving the objective." Id., page 680. In this case, Section 30-14.5 does not abrogate any right but merely sets forth a procedure and time
period for the establishment of rights attendant to a valid marriage. The
statute's time periods and procedures, even if restrictive, are justified because
clear social and economic evils would exist unless the statute were followed.
As set forth above, the State has a vital interest in regulating marriages.
Therefore, the Appellant cannot establish the second prong of the Berry
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analysis.
The Appellee respectfully submits that Utah's common law marriage
statute is neither a statute of repose nor limitations and, even if it were
characterized as such, it is not unconstitutional. The District Court's decision
rejecting the Appellant's claim of unconstitutionality should be upheld on
appeal.
Point Four
THE APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The District Court rejected the Appellee's claim for attorney's fees and
costs. (R. 228-230). The District Court's decision was in error. As discussed,
supra, the Appellant's obligation to establish her claim of a common law
marriage within the time of the alleged relationship or one year thereafter was
clear under the statute and Bunch. The Appellant simply failed to do so as
required by the statute and Bunch. The Appellant's continued resistance to the
trial court's decision dismissing her Complaint, with spurious and frivolous
claims, is not proper and has resulted in substantial attorney's fees and costs.
The Appellee should also be entitled to attorney's fees and costs on
appeal under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure. The
Appellant continues to advance frivolous arguments to disguise her own
failures in this case. The Appellant's arguments on appeal are not pursued in
good faith, not warranted under existing law, and not made in good faith to
extend, modify or reverse existing law. Cf. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Ut.
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App 1987)
The Court should remand to the District Court for the purpose of
determining an award of fees and costs for the Appellee expended below and
on appeal
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The decision of the District Court dismissing the Appellant's Complaint
with prejudice should be upheld The Court should award attorney's fees and
costs to the Appellee, incurred both before the trial court and on appeal, and
remand the case to the District Court for the purpose of determining the amount
of fees and costs
DATED this )tf

day of November, 1999

STEPHEN W COOK
Attorney for Respondent
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